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MORE THAN JUST PRECEDENT: PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT WRITING
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE KATRINA BANKS-SMITH*
1 INTRODUCTION
Notre Dame University is privileged to hold the Coram books of the late Honourable David
Malcolm AC QC. Those books are a set of beautifully handwritten notes of trials and hearings
before his Honour. It would be very rare these days for a judge to keep such a detailed record.
Those notebooks are therefore an important piece of legal history, not just as a record of the
particular trials but as a record of how judges work. I am very honoured to have been asked to
deliver this fifth Memorial Lecture in tribute to David Malcolm's legacy, and inspired by those
beautiful notebooks, I have chosen to talk about the written word and judgments as records.
But first I would like to say something about David Malcolm. I did not have the honour of
knowing him. The only time I appeared before him was when I was admitted to the roll of
practitioners in 1990. I regret that I am unable to speak first-hand of his attributes and qualities.
They are, however, well recognised.
His professional record from Rhodes Scholar to Queens Counsel to Chief Justice of Western
Australia was exemplary. As a barrister he appeared on many occasions before the High Court
and the Privy Council. His judicial service included well-known highlights such as the quashing
of John Button's murder conviction.1
His commitment to the community was broad, serving on many organisations. His commitment
to education was enduring, as witnessed in the later years of his career by his service to this
University as a Professor and Adjunct Professor of Law.
His legacy is recognised in particular by the naming of the David Malcolm Justice Centre in his
honour, the building that now houses the Supreme Court of Western Australia and other offices
vital to the administration of justice, including the State Solicitor's Office.
David Malcolm was also devoted to his wife Kaaren, and daughter Manisha, and they continue
to be very much in the thoughts of those who recall his remarkable contribution. I acknowledge
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Mrs Malcolm's presence here this evening.2 I am also pleased to see students in the audience as
in preparing this talk, I had students in particular in mind.
II THE TOPIC
I am speaking today from the perspective of a civil judge. Leaving aside court time, the life of
a civil judge is very much one of writing. For any decision of significance, written reasons must
be given. Court time is in the main the interesting part, a theatre where the unpredictable is
played out. Otherwise the role can be somewhat solitary, working away in chambers
formulating thoughts, making decisions on evidence and writing.
The first part of this talk is about creating judgments. Some of the themes might be familiar.
For example, what is the purpose of judgments? Who is the audience? How do judges write?
What is revealed by different styles of writing? Some of this has been written about in detail
and for those of you with an interest in how judges write, the Hon Michael Kirby's 1990 article
'On the Writing of Judgments' remains enlightening and current.3
But then in the second part, I would like to talk about the broader role of judgments, the life
they might take on after delivery and their sometimes inadvertent role in recording social
history.
I first started thinking about this topic when I came across a line in a book about American
artists that commented on the extraordinary number of paintings in galleries of court room
scenes, lawyers and jury debates. The author noted that this fascination is also reflected in
literature about the law. In addition to art and literature, we can add movies, TV series and
podcasts. Trials and true crime capture the interest and fascination of many, many people. I do
not suggest that people are anywhere near as captivated by reading civil judgments.
But in their own way, judgments have a broader role in recording the history of a society than
might be assumed. From the 19th century cases on disputed wills, expectancies, and
improvident heirs and through the 20th century rise of industrial and consumer law, we have a
written record of the changing face of society. I will make reference to some well-known and
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less well-known judgments from the last 50 years that reveal a record of sometimes the
mundane and sometimes the more profound aspects of life in our community.
Sometimes the importance of a judgment as a record is only recognised through the lens of
retrospectivity, but in other cases it may as well have been thumped down on the bench, rather
than 'delivered', such is its immediate and obvious impact.
But first - to Part 1.
III PART 1: CREATING JUDGMENTS
A The Context
As we know, judgments are records of the reasons for decisions. A judge has an obligation to
find facts, record relevant findings of credibility, ascertain the applicable law and apply it in a
method which exposes reasoning so that any rights of appeal can be exercised.
Courts are required to resolve conflicts and provide reasons to the parties. So most importantly,
judges must write for the parties, but our precedent based system means the audience is
potentially broader: beyond the parties, a judgment might bind other judges and it must permit
application in broader or different factual circumstances.
From my perspective when sitting as a first instance judge, the primary aim is to write reasons
that explain to the parties the outcome and address the issues they have raised. There is very
rarely the luxury of time that might permit an attempt to add more generally to the jurisprudence
of the law and write something of broader use. The reality in a busy court is that it is essential
to focus on the issues between the parties and what the parties need to hear.
There is always the spectre of an appeal court hanging over us when we deliver a first instance
judgment. On a day to day basis I try to write without undue concern about the appeal process.
However, it would be artificial to assume that judges respond to their decisions being
overturned with equanimity. I would suggest that most judges care deeply about their work and
so naturally do not like being wrong - or, as some judges might see it, being considered by
others to be wrong. However, the appellate process is vital in developing the law. It is also vital
in correcting error and in that sense it provides a level of comfort to primary judges.
Writing at the appellate level is different. At that point the focus is very much on the law and
whether there has been error below. Scrutinising the work of your fellow judge for error might
3

seem an unpalatable task, but generally speaking appellate courts undertake that task conscious
of the difficulty of matters that come to them from a primary decision. Take for example the
recent High Court decision in ASIC v Kobelt,4 in which the High Court addressed whether
particular conduct by Mr Kobelt in providing credit to Aboriginal people living in a remote
community was unconscionable. Anyone who might think the answer was straightforward
should reflect on the fact that there were five separate sets of reasons published and the decision
in Mr Kobelt's favour was a 4:3 majority.5
There is also a practical caveat that limits the extent to which judges can indulge in the writing
process. In his paper to which I have referred, Michael Kirby said:
Pressure upon modern judges - at first instance and on appeal - is, in most instances,
much greater than it was in the case of their forebears. True, the High Court of Australia
can now, by the requirement of special leave, control its workload. But for most judges,
there is much less control. The backlog increases. Community and institutional pressure
for speedier justice is relentless. The time for reflection, for careful planning, thoughtful
research and for polishing prose, is strictly limited. And diminishing. It is in this world
of unprecedented stress and pressure that most judges, today, complete their judgments.

I doubt that the position has improved since 1990. We must all do the best we can, and push
our product out efficiently and carefully.
So all of those things are relevant to the context in which judges write. Now I am going to turn
to the far more interesting question of style.
B The Question of Style
Leaving aside the requirement to give reasons, there are no rules as to how an individual judge
must write. Each judge brings their own legal, cultural and educational background to the task
and it is inevitable that styles will differ.
Some prefer a succinct and clinical approach, and cavil with any attempt by judges to do more.
Others take the opportunity to engage more generally, displaying knowledge of matters that go
well beyond the issues at hand. It is perhaps the variety of approaches that makes judgment
reading day after day a bearable and enjoyable task. The central task of recording the facts and
the law might be predictable, but there are many tools or motifs used in writing that sometimes
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make it more interesting, and I will refer to five: the literary allusions; the swipes to the legal
profession; the titbits for social media; the appropriate opportunity for entertainment; and the
justified self-indulgence.
C Literary Allusion
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Shakespeare continues to be the runaway winner as a rich source of
inspiration for judges.
Over the last 50 years, Shakespeare has been referred to in more than a fleeting manner in over
64 superior court judgments. There is the occasional reference to a sonnet, but the most popular
works are King Lear, The Merchant of Venice, Macbeth, Hamlet, Richard III and As You Like
It.
In Owen J's 10,000 paragraph first instance judgment in the Bell litigation,6 his Honour referred
to not one but three different works of Shakespeare: Timon of Athens, Hamlet and Othello. I
should add that Owen J includes many other references that disclose his enormous and enviable
knowledge of the classics, history and religion.
This year Shakespeare was the source of renewed focus in the Federal Court, not only because
of the Geoffrey Rush defamation trial.7 To be fair, the subject matter in that case perhaps gifted
the primary judge with the opportunity to quote King Lear and completely in context.
Perhaps less anticipated was this headline from the Australian Financial Review: 'Bard on side
of court buttocks-flasher'.8 This refers to Logan J's judgment in Ogawa v Attorney-General
(No 2),9 in which the opening paragraph cites Portia's soliloquy on the quality of mercy from
The Merchant of Venice in support of the potential for a royal pardon. Ms Ogawa, who holds a
Doctor of Philosophy in Law, was jailed for contempt after flashing her buttocks when on trial.
The pickings are less rich when it comes to references to Australian authors or poets. Tim
Winton, Richard Flanagan, Patrick White, Manning Clark and Christina Stead have scored a
mention, but not quotes. Sally Morgan has been quoted in the context of Aboriginal history.
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Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (No 9) [2008] WASC 239 ('Bell').
Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 7) [2019] FCA 496 [1].
8
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There are also the odd quotes from Banjo Paterson, Marcus Clarke and Henry Lawson. There
is clearly room for improvement by judges in this area.
D Swipes to the Profession
There are then those judges who, having clearly withstood years of quiet frustration with the
profession, allow things to finally reach a boil. Take for example, the occasion when Martin CJ
of the WA Supreme Court, annoyed with a pleading strike out application, breathed life into
the word 'pettifogging':10
In this case, I have reviewed the statement of claim and the objections to it and I have
done so in the case management context to which I have referred. It is my view, that
many of the objections which have been taken are pedantic and pettifogging in nature.
In many cases, elucidating and resolving the objection would consume an amount of
time and resources, which is entirely disproportionate to the benefit to be derived from
that process in terms of the identification of the true issues which have to be met in the
case.

Or consider the empathy-inducing catchwords of Hamill J in R v Taleb (No 3):11
CRIMINAL LAW - Indictment - Amendment - Application made at the end of trial Offence of engaging in conduct preparatory to foreign incursion offence Complications of Criminal Code - Fault element not specified - Recklessness pleaded
in original indictment - Prize for providing written submission on recklessness that
made sense - Prize not claimed …

E Titbits for Social Media
Whilst law students and young lawyers in particular have long taken a special interest in sharing
either hilarious or embarrassing moments before the court, and preferably the High Court,
judges have certainly been feeding them quite a bit of material by way of amusing catchwords
or one-liners in the last few years, spread enthusiastically by social media.
Catchwords that have been gleefully shared include this one from State of New South Wales v
Michael David Jones:12
CIVIL LAW - continuing detention order - preliminary - hearing - amendments to
legislation - nature of test at preliminary hearing - substantial body of evidence rhubarb and apple crumble - no question of principle
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Or the lovely opening line from Lee J of the Federal Court in Oliver v Nine Network Australia
Pty Ltd:13
[1]
Nothing good happens after two o'clock in the morning. Or another from Lee J,
this time in Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Limited v Procter & Gamble Australia
Pty Limited,14 which concerned ongoing litigation about an advertisement for
dishwashing detergent known as 'Fairy Platinum':
[5]
The gentle rinse of dishwashing detergent is not reflective of the vigorous thrust
of commercial rivalry between the protagonists. It is plain that the automatic
dishwashing detergent market in which both RBA and PGA operate is highly
competitive.

F 'Appropriate' Opportunity for Humour
There are some occasions where the subject matter really invites some humour. This is an area
to be handled with care. Litigation is often one of the most stressful and financially draining
experiences that people endure. The result has the potential to impact quite significantly. It is
not a time for humour that might not be well received by a party.
However, it can be done appropriately. Take this detailed treatise on fish oil from Perram J in
Nature's Care Manufacture Pty Ltd v Australian Made Campaign Ltd,15 a case about whether
fish-oil tablets were 'made in Australia' in circumstances where all ingredients were sourced
overseas:
[21]
I find that the fish oil imported from Chile smells unpleasant. I was provided
with a sample of this fish oil as Exhibit MX-3 and have smelt it. It smells like a cross
between stale fish and vinyl. My associate thinks it smells like semi-fermented grass
cuttings revealing his more sophisticated nose. I have not tasted it but I am prepared to
infer that it would be very unpleasant to consume even in small doses. I also accept that
placing the fish oil in the soft-gel capsules has the effect of making palatable and
flavourless a product which is essentially very unpleasant. It has another benefit too.
By sealing the fish oil in the capsules the speed of oxidation is reduced and, along with
that, the rate of deterioration in the fish oil caused by exposure to light. This is not the
case with the liquid fish oil imported from Chile.
…
[23]
There is a related issue. Professor Barrow properly drew my attention to the
phenomenon of 'burp-back'. 'Burp-back' occurs when a soft-gel capsule containing
something malodorous such as fish oil is consumed. Once the capsule descends into
the digestive depths of the stomach the soft-gel dissolves releasing its noxious payload
13

[2019] FCA 583.
[2018] FCA 378.
15
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14
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the odour of which, thus liberated, rises up the gullet to the mouth where, unsought and
unwelcome, it presents itself as a salutary warning against the perils of belching. …

G Deserved Indulgence
Finally - there are occasions where it is expected that a judge might indulge a little and none of
the parties would expect anything less. One of those cases was the epic Bell trial to which I
have already referred. A single judge who wrestles with issues of such magnitude over such a
period of time is fully entitled to add their own colour. I suspect Owen J had a few favourite
expressions he wanted to utilise somewhere:
[9761] From time to time during the last 5 years I felt as if I were confined to an
oubliette. There were occasions on which I thought the task of completing this case
might be sempiternal. Fortunately, I have not yet been called upon to confront the
infinite and, better still, a nepenthe beckons. Part of the nepenthe (which may even bear
that name) is likely to involve a yeast-based substance. It will most certainly involve a
complete avoidance of making decisions and writing judgments.
[9762] For the moment, in the words of Ovid (with an embellishment from the old
Latin Mass): Iamque opus exegi, Deo gratias.16

H Before We Move On - Room for Improvement
But to return to the more mundane, and the common criticisms of judgments that they are too
hard to read and are too long.
In my view, those few examples to which I have referred indicate that writers have in fact
embraced English as an evolving language. Judges have indicated a willingness to entertain
English as a growing and living language: utilising a modern vocabulary; embracing the
singular plural and other gender neutral and culturally sensitive terms; avoiding the overdefining of obvious expressions; and increasingly using the active as against passive voice. But
these are details. The important task is to write accessible, readable judgments.
In her article 'Some Thoughts on Writing Judgments in, and for, Contemporary Australia', 17
Justice Mortimer records the progression from historically short reasons by way of notes of
court hearings that were taken by observers or a court recorder, to the detailed judgments of our
time.18 Justice Mortimer notes that the notion that judges should explain their decisions is of
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The work is done, thanks be to God.
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Ibid 283.
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recent origin, and queries whether we currently have the right balance between explaining the
use of judicial power and the way we use judicial time and resources, with consequential effect
on the parties and other litigants of seeking access to justice.19
In days of electronic data and where business and many other communications take place
largely by email, the quantum of recorded evidence is so large that even setting out the relevant
facts and making findings on documents can be a very lengthy task, even before assessing any
oral evidence.
Conversations around introducing short form judgments and similar innovations are frequent
around the courts but there is no doubt that progress toward any quantum shift in the writing
obligations of a trial judge is slow. However, there are some steps that are taken routinely to
reduce the amount of judgment writing.
These days interlocutory skirmishes around pleadings, discovery, security for costs and the like
are often directed to a confidential conference with a registrar or specific mediation. The
success rate of that course in order to narrow the issues that require written judgments and
reduce the need for interlocutory judgments in my experience is high.
A second step is continued emphasis by active case management on the role of the lawyers, and
indeed their clients, in narrowing the scope of disclosure and document production and the
nature of issues that are to be resolved by the court. This will often involve directing the parties
to attempt to agree issues for determination. It will generally be a requirement where senior
counsel are briefed that they confer about and engage in that process. All stakeholders in
litigation stand to benefit from such an approach.
But that is enough about the creation of judgments. Let us now apply a retrospective lens.
IV PART 2: JUDGMENTS AS RECORDS OF HISTORY
We can move from viewing judgments as a pedestrian account of a moment in time, or a dispute
in time, to seeing a more universal role. We can view judgments as a record of history. This
role, perhaps not always appreciated, is significant.

19

Ibid.
9

History records cultural change and key events in a range of media, and there is no reason to
exclude from that archive the written judgment with its precisely recorded factual details, its
records of the common place, its record in extracts from transcripts of how we spoke and its
snapshot of our social mores. Then there are Native Title judgments with their actual record of
history: a record of oral history passed down, interviews, transcripts of descriptions by
claimants and elders, explaining who is able to speak for country, who has control over country,
identification by language group and similar connections.20
But the role of judgments in recording history is seen most keenly by any review of decisions
that stand as turning points of cultural change - landmark decisions on religious freedom,
women's rights, the rights of minorities, land rights, rights to counsel, sanctions against abuse
of power, censorship laws, and so on.
For most Australians, Mabo21 is the definitive landmark decision, a decision that negated the
17th century doctrine of terra nullis and recognised Aboriginal Australians as the original
inhabitants of Australia. It led to the introduction of native title legislation and recognition of
traditional rights. There are many other such decisions: Chamberlain v The Queen,22 standing
as a stark reminder to us all of the importance of keeping an open mind; Dietrich v The Queen,23
acknowledging formally the right to a fair trial; and even from the dry area of contract law,
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher,24 where the harshness of contract law was ameliorated
by equity and the sword and shield of promissory estoppel.
I have chosen a selection of four cases from across environmental, criminal, family-related and
consumer law, and not all High Court cases, to address the rhetorical question, 'how far have
we come'?
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A Commonwealth v Tasmania
First - when did we start taking the environment seriously?
South-west Tasmania is a remote and imposing part of Australia. It is now world famous and
carefully protected as a wilderness area. Access is by foot, light plane or sea. Its weather is
harsh, but its scenery is stunning. In the late 1970s the Hydro-Electric Commission, a
Tasmanian State government agency, drafted a proposal for the construction of two dams on
the Gordon River. Tasmania had been building hydro dams and power stations since the turn
of the last century, in places with deceptively lyrical names like Miena, Tungatinah and
Wyatinah. If you are familiar with Richard Flanagan's 'The Sound of One Hand Clapping', you
might recall that the father, Bojan Buloh, was a Slovenian refugee, recruited as part of an
immigrant labour force to live in a construction camp in the central highlands of Tasmania to
do 'the wog work' of building a dam.
The Hydro is an important employer in Tasmania. On a personal note, my father, my
father-in-law and one of my brothers all worked for the Hydro at some point, which gives you
some insight into its significance to the Tasmanian economy.
The construction of the Gordon River dams would have generated one-third of the State's
electricity needs, but at the cost of flooding the nearby Franklin River wilderness area, an area
of some 9,500 hectares within the National Park. The Labor State government made the area a
National Park in 1981 in acknowledgement of the area's natural significance and asked that the
area be entered on the World Heritage List. An election the following year brought in a Liberal
State government that supported the dams project, and the process of construction approvals
began. The majority of Tasmanians supported the project in a 1981 plebiscite. State legislation
was passed to vest land in the Hydro for the purpose of construction of the dams and auxiliary
works: the Gordon River Hydro-Electric Power Development Act 1982 (Tas).
However, an intense public campaign then began, under the stewardship of Dr Bob Brown and
The Wilderness Society. There were over 1,200 arrests as protesters set up blockades of the site.
Bob Brown even spent several days in prison. There were protest marches in the streets of
Hobart. This was pre-social media, pre-mobile phones: yet thousands were galvanised to march
in the streets to draw attention to the impending loss. The iconic yellow 'no dams' triangle was
a hugely successful example of branding. That triangle was everywhere, from cars to bags to
banners.
11

The protest gained international attention, and in late 1982 UNESCO declared south-west
Tasmania a World Heritage Site under the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage. At that time the only other Australian World Heritage Site was Kakadu.
The timing was important. A Federal election was due in 1983. Bob Hawke promised that if
Labor won the election, it would save the south-west wilderness. Labor won the election and,
as promised, took steps to save the wilderness area. The government looked to its obligations
under the World Heritage Convention and passed the World Heritage Properties Conservation
Act 1983 (Cth) which restricted activities on heritage sites, including those deemed heritage
sites by international treaties.
The Tasmanian government was not best pleased. And so, it began. Tasmania challenged the
Constitutional validity of the Act in the High Court, arguing that by the Act the Commonwealth
exceeded its authority to legislate for external affairs (s 51 (xxix) of the Constitution) and to
regulate corporations (s 51(xx)). The Commonwealth did not win all the arguments before the
High Court and the decision itself was a 4:3 majority - but vitally, it decided that the
Commonwealth had power under the external affairs power to stop the dams based on
Australia's international obligations. And the Franklin River and surrounding south-west
Tasmania wilderness area remain protected to this day.
In the reasons of the High Court25 (and I add that they fill half a volume of the Commonwealth
Law Reports and were written in a month) the Chief Justice captured the tension that brought
the claim to the High Court whilst at the same time noted the strictly legal question with which
it was concerned:
No lawyer will need to be told that in these proceedings the Court is not called upon to
decide whether the Gordon below Franklin Scheme ought to proceed. It is not for the
Court to weigh the economic needs of Tasmania against the possible damage that will
be caused to the archaeological sites and the wilderness area if the construction of the
dam proceeds. The wisdom and expediency of the two competing courses are matters
of policy for the Governments to consider, and not for the Court. We are concerned
with a strictly legal question - whether the Commonwealth regulations and the
Commonwealth statute are within constitutional power.

The reasons necessarily contain a detailed consideration of the legal issues. But they do more
than that. For example, they contain a history of the operations of the Hydro-Electric
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Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 60.
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Commission in Tasmania from 1895;26 a list of items from the 64 sites at that time on the natural
heritage sites maintained under the World Heritage Convention27 (a list that now runs to some
1,121 items);28 a complete history of the entanglement of state and federal legislation and
regulations enacted during the course of the controversy; and a collection of agreements
reflecting international concern about the environment and pollution.29 In short, they provide a
written record of the context in which the High Court came to consider in 1983 the particular
legal questions to which its attention was limited.
The Dams case is widely seen to be the most influential constitutional law case in Australian
history, but it also stands very much as a record of how protest and changing policy led to valid
legislative intervention. It remains relevant as we now face unprecedented environmental
challenges and as we continue to witness the cycle and value of lawful, non-violent protest.
B LCM v State of Western Australia
Now to the criminal justice system and a sad indictment - when did we finally wake up to Foetal
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, or FASD?
History will show that it was not until this decade that the criminal justice system really
understood that FASD was relevant to both cognitive and physical development. Although there
were a handful of prior decisions that mentioned FASD,30 the decision of the Western
Australian Court of Appeal in LCM v State of Western Australia31 is significant for three
reasons: first, it frankly acknowledges a lack of appropriate knowledge amongst professionals
of the symptoms and profile of FASD; second, it provides guidance to prosecutors, defenders
and sentencing judges as to the relevance of the disorder in the context of mental impairment;
and third, it reminds us that the justice system cannot act in isolation but is dependent upon a
broader community interest and research into matters that effect criminal culpability.
The offender in LCM was a 15-year-old boy who violently assaulted his newborn son in a
hospital room, causing injuries from which the baby died. He was convicted in the Children's
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Ibid 12-13.
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Court on a plea of guilty to manslaughter and in preparation for sentencing underwent the usual
pre-sentence report process and was also reviewed by a psychologist and psychiatrist, neither
of whom referred to any mental impairment or brain injury. He was sentenced to 10 years
detention with eligibility for supervised release. He appealed his sentence on the ground that it
was manifestly excessive.
While in detention, LCM was reviewed by a research team from the Telethon Kids Institute and
was diagnosed with FASD. An essential element of the disorder is that the person has suffered
a prenatal, permanent organic brain injury as a result of maternal alcohol consumption in
pregnancy. Such foetal exposure to alcohol can produce a variety of different disorders within
a spectrum, with effects that might be suffered to an extent which varies from minor to
profound.
The late diagnosis of LCM's condition provided the basis for a second ground of appeal, being
that the sentencing judge had not taken into account a significant mitigatory factor, the
additional evidence of the FASD diagnosis not having been before his Honour at the time.
Additional medical reports attested to the precise nature of LCM's impairment. One of the
specialists concluded that if a detailed nature of LCM's impairment had been understood and
there had been some intervention early in his life, 'some of his and his loved ones' lived trauma
may have been prevented'.32 The appeal succeeded and the sentence was reduced, as the Court
was satisfied that his prenatal brain damage had left him more vulnerable to traumas he had
suffered as a child, a mitigating factor when his circumstances were considered as a whole.
What an important decision this is in terms of what we learn from it and apply going forward,
and how fortuitous that the Telethon Kids Institute came across this particular young man.
C H v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
Migration cases provide a wealth of information about international civil unrest and the
responses to refugee and asylum claims, but the case I want to mention is actually from the
citizenship stream. It is not a case that was met with any great media attention, but it had
important ramifications.

32
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At issue in H v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship33 was whether the word 'parent' was
limited to biological parents with a genetic link. The Full Federal Court found that a child could
be an Australian citizen by descent through a person who was not a biological parent but acted
in a parental capacity. It found that as a matter of statutory construction, there was nothing in
the Act that limited the meaning of 'parent' to a biological parent but rather it has the meaning
it bears in ordinary contemporary English usage. The reference to contemporary usage is
important and acknowledges squarely the capacity for change. The following paragraphs are
particularly poignant, in my view:
[128] The word 'parent' is an everyday word in the English language, expressive both
of status and relationship to another. Today, as the Citizenship Act itself recognizes,
not all parents become parents in the same way: see, e.g., s 8 of the Citizenship Act; H
v J (2006) 205 FLR 464 at 466, citing Re Patrick (2002) 168 FLR 6 at [323], [325]
(Guest J). This is not to say that parents do not share common characteristics; everyday
use of the word indicates that they do.
[129] Being a parent within the ordinary meaning of the word may depend on various
factors, including social, legal and biological. Once, in the case of an illegitimate child,
biological connection was not enough; today, biological connection in specific
instances may not be enough: Citizenship Act, s 8 referring to ss 60H and 60HB of the
Family Law Act, in turn picking up prescribed State and Territory laws such as the
Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic). Perhaps in the typical case, almost all the relevant
considerations, whether biological, legal, or social, will point to the same persons as
being the 'parents' of a person. Typically, parentage is not just a matter of biology but
of intense commitment to another, expressed by acknowledging that other person as
one’s own and treating him or her as one's own.

I doubt that such words would have been said had the question been addressed by the court a
few decades previously.
In a similar vein, the decision in the Commonwealth v ACT34 that saw the ACT's short-lived
Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT) struck down was important in opening the door
to the vote that led to the changes to The Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), another defining moment in
Australian legislative and social history.

33
34

[2010] FCAFC 119; (2010) 188 FCR 393.
(2013) 250 CLR 441.
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D Free Range Egg Cases
But now to what might at first seem more prosaic - the topic of eggs. But in eggs we see the
rise of the ethical consumer. In the last 10 years the ACCC has brought proceedings against
some 11 egg producers. As Edelman J expressed it in ACCC v RL Adams Pty Ltd:35
[1]
This penalty hearing is yet another case concerning false, and misleading or
deceptive conduct concerning 'free range' animals. Sellers of products such as chicken,
duck, or eggs obtain a premium price by representing their products to be derived from
animals that live or lived 'free range'.

Some of the practices the courts have considered include egg producers engaging in misleading
or deceptive conduct by putting cage eggs in cartons marked free range in order to meet high
demand for free-range eggs, or similarly including non-organic eggs in cartons marked as
organic.
Those cases have highlighted the importance of the product labelling in securing consumer
dollars, and also the importance of model codes and enforceable standards that might clearly
explain what is meant by terms such as 'free range'. For example, whilst descriptions such as
'free range densities' might say something about how many birds per hectare might be housed,
what do they say about hours of access for the birds to the outside, or rotation of access? What
do they say about protection of the animals? Are conditions consistent with consumer
expectations?
The cases reflect the rise of the ethical consumer: that consumers care and are interested in how
animals are treated by those who profit from our purchases, but that their concern can be
exploited by producers.
This is an area where there are many lobbyists and consumer groups. But what is interesting is
that experts in the field speak of the importance of regulation and enforcement by misleading
and deceptive conduct legislation and the courts. In fact, enforcement action has been described
as the strongest force for change and improvement in the area.36

35

[2015] FCA 1016.
C Parker and J De Costa, 'Misleading the Ethical Consumer: The Regulation of Free-Range Egg Labelling'
(2016) 39 Melbourne University Law Review 895 at 940.
36
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It is interesting to consider the compilation of penalties set out in ACCC v RL Adams, indicating
a range of fines in the realm of $300,000 and $400,000 in some cases. Those amounts have
been exceeded in subsequent cases.
The number of proceedings against supermarkets and producers in the last decade in this area
and the description of farming and production processes in the judgments stand as a fascinating
record of a clear turning point in terms of consumer protection beyond safety or financial
matters and into the ethical. I suspect we all look at egg carton labelling a little differently these
days.
V CONCLUSION
It is often said that the volumes of law reports on the bookshelves are filled with cases where
all the parties thought they were right. Whilst that comment stands as a reminder to the repeat
litigant, it is important to remember that within those volumes, or electronic folders or
databases, also lies a rich source of information about how we have looked at the world over
time. I am a follower of Michael Apted's 7 Up television documentary series. In fact, I have
found the series strangely moving over the years, perhaps because of the so-called recognition
factor. We see bits of ourselves in the people whose lives have been followed over the years,
and we recognise that in so many ways we are all the same, with the same hopes and the same
fears. Or perhaps I find it moving because as the participants age, so do I, like it or not. Such
social documentaries of history are invaluable. We cannot reduce years of Australian legal
judgments into a television documentary archive, but we can view them differently. They are
not just about precedent, but also contribute to the social history of our mistakes and our
progress.

17

